Europe and its Fears in the Age of Anxiety: Historiography and Perspectives by Silei, Gianni
De Europa 
Vol. 1, No. 1 (2018), 17-28 
 
www.deeuropa.unito.it 
 
 
 
 
Europe and its Fears in the Age of Anxiety: Historiography and 
Perspectives 
Gianni Silei1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In 1946, Albert Camus wrote a series of contributions to Combat Magazine 
titled Neither Victims nor Executioners. These articles were a profound reflection 
on Europe’s war scars and the risk of a third World War: “The seventeenth century” 
– he wrote – “was the century of mathematics, the eighteenth that of the physical 
sciences, and the nineteenth that of biology. Our twentieth century is the century 
of fear” (Camus 1946: 257). 
It is a widespread public perception that the so called “Society of Fear” 
started on September 11, 2001, but it was after the attacks of Madrid, in 2004, 
that “American fear” also invaded Europe, tragically giving the full significance to 
the expression coined by the editor of Le Monde, Jean-Marie Colombani: Nous 
sommes tous Américains (Colombani 2001: 1). Therefore, concepts such as “Risk 
Society” or “Uncertainty Society” have ceased to be topics for discussions 
restricted to intellectual or academic circles and, amplified by the media, a debate 
of global proportions has started (Rosenwein and Cristiani 2018: 110-120).  
However, “Americans did not discover terrorism after September 11, 2001”. 
Terrorism (and fear) “came to the forefront of American consciousness, and pop 
culture, in the 1990s” (Kavadlo 2015: 2). According to David Lyon, “9/11 was 
apocalyptic in the proper sense of the term”: the attacks on the Twin Towers have 
simply revealed a generalised sense of uncertainty, anxiety and vulnerability that 
was already present in Western collective sensibility (Lyon 2003: 17-18).  
Although our age appears pervaded by a plethora of fears, this dimension is 
not at all exclusive of what has been called the “postmodern condition” (Lyotard: 
1979). Social fears have always existed, and they have emerged whenever human 
beings and their communities have been forced to face catastrophic events, threats 
or risk situations, both real and perceived. For instance, Lucien Febvre very 
effectively summarised the dominant feeling in Europe in the sixteenth century: 
Peur toujours, peur partout (Febvre 1942: 380). Fear is a primary emotion deeply 
rooted in every aspect of human existence: it is “the original sin of life.” – wrote 
Guglielmo Ferrero – “Every living creature capable of moving is frightening and 
cause fright” (Ferrero 1947: 318).  
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Is it therefore possible to study individual and collective fears with a 
historiographical approach, that is to rationalise something so pervasive but at the 
same time so irrational and elusive as emotions? This same question was posed by 
Febvre in Sensibility and History, an essay published in 1941, where he complained 
of a serious lack of historical investigation in this field: “We have no history of 
Love” - he denounced – “We have no history of Death. We have no history of Pity, 
or of Cruelty. We have no history of Joy” (Febvre 1973: 12-26). Febvre was 
certainly not the first to raise the question of writing a history of feelings. From 
Herodotus to Thucydides and Polybius, historians have always dealt with emotions. 
However, it was only from the nineteenth century, with the emergence of cultural 
history approach, that some of them, together with art historians or sociologists 
tried to understand the role that they have played in the historical process.  
The most significant contributions came in the twentieth century. In 1919, 
Johan Huizinga, in The Waning of the Middle Ages, compared the mentality of the 
ancients with the modern one, emphasising that during the premodern era “all the 
things seemed more clearly marked than to us” and “the contrast between 
suffering and joy, between adversity and happiness, appeared more striking” 
(Huizinga 1924: 9-10). In the early 1930s, George Lefebvre published his works on 
the Great Fear of 1789 (Lefebvre 1932, 1934), describing how France “became 
gripped by an almost universal fear, shared by authorities and citizens alike” and 
most of all showing that “fear bred fear” (Rudé 1973: x). In his already cited essay, 
Febvre considered Huizinga’s study, and explicitly mentioned Henri Berr’s approach 
based on historical psychology “of peoples and individuals”. At the same time, he 
also declared that he had been influenced by the psychological theories that Henri 
Wallon had included in an article published in the Encyclopédie française (Müller 
1996, Neri 1996, Rosenwein 2001).  
Febvre would deal with this issue few years later (Febvre 1956) in a review 
dedicated to a study by Jean Halpérin focused on social security, which indirectly 
confirmed that “every conception of insecurity embraces a notion of what security 
is” (Vail 1999: 5). Except Ferrero and Bibó (Bibó 1997, 2015), in the following 
decades, history of emotions remained matter for medieval and modern historians 
that analysed this topic in biographical research, or in studies focused on collective 
behaviours. This search area would have been finally expanded from the mid-
1970s, within studies centred on ‘private’ dimension, family or affective dynamics, 
and gender relations or on history of mentality and sensibility (Ariès 1975, 1977, 
1983; Delumeau 1978, 1983; Corbin 1982; Vovelle 1983).   
It was in the mid-1980s that Peter and Carol Stearns presented a new 
perspective based on the definition of emotionology (Stearns P.N. and C.Z. 1985: 
813). This approach had been influenced by Norbert Elias (Elias 2010) as also as by 
sociological and psychological studies published in the 1970s (DeMause 1975). It 
was on these bases that the Stearns published their books on Anger and Jealousy 
(Stearns C.Z and P.N. 1986, Stearns P.N. 1989), which were followed by a series of 
individual and collective studies (Stearns P.N. 1999, 2006; Stearns P.N. and 
Haggerty 1991, Stearns P.N. and Lewis 1999). The panorama was enriched with 
further contributions and perspectives. Psychohistory, for example, was the 
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dominant approach of Peter Gay’s inquiry into the life of bourgeoisie of Nineteenth 
century Europe (Gay 1984-1996). 
The definitive ‘institutionalization’ of the history of emotions would have 
come in the 1990s. During this phase, in addition to English and French literature, 
many other contributions were published in different languages (Placanica 1993; 
Vegetti Finzi 1995; Rasini 2011; Frevert 2000, 2009, 2011, 2014; Borrero 2013). The 
state of the art today is very different from that highlighted by Febvre. In fact, “In 
the mid-twentieth century” – has rightly noted Plamper – “Febvre described the 
‘history of feelings’ as almost ‘virgin territory’ […]. More than fifty year later, at 
the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth-first century, this ‘terra 
incognita’ is being measured and mapped, claims are being staked out” (Plamper 
2012: 74). 
 
 
2. Sources and Approach 
What is fear? Is it a physiological and psychological response to external 
stimuli or vice versa is it mainly a cultural product? And how can it be studied? In 
his contribution previously mentioned, Febvre provided some examples of sources 
that could be useful for the historian: “We have documents on moral conduct […]; 
artistic documents […]; and literary documents” (Febvre 1973). Another “fruitful 
approach to the history of emotions” – as Max Weiss recently noted – “has been the 
philological” (Weiss 2012: 1). More in general, scholars have used other diversified 
sources such as diaries, wills, memoirs, personal writings, literature, artistic 
production, and philosophical/theological works.  
Since fear is both instinctive and cultural, it is of great importance that 
historians would not be conditioned by visions or overly restrictive patterns. At the 
same time, the emotional lexicon must therefore be sought wherever possible and 
with an open approach towards contributions of other disciplines without however 
being influenced by them (Plamper 2012: 33). Nevertheless, the historian should 
not only look for the presence of sentiments but also their absence. As Barbara 
Rosenwein has pointed out, historians must also be capable to read and interpret 
metaphors, irony, even – especially above all – silences (Rosenwein 2010).  
A major role in the creation and diffusion of collective fears, especially for 
contemporary historians, has been played by media. This aspect has been widely 
studied from different perspectives. In The Culture of Fear, for instance, Frank 
Furedi provided a significant account of the increasing importance of the British 
media (Furedi 1997). From the perspective of the historian, the relevant role of the 
media in the creation of collective fears has roots that go back to the early stages 
of the mass society, such as the satirical radio broadcast aired in 1926 from the 
BBC’s Edinburgh studios, that described an imaginary strike degenerating and 
caused disquiet and panic among many British listeners (Bourke 2005: 168-178). 
Fear can be also fuelled by what has been called shock economy, that is 
“corporations and politicians who exploit the fear and disorientation [...] to push 
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through economic shock therapy” (Klein 2007: 25-26). This aspect is closely related 
to the so-called “Politics of Fear”. By “political fear” Corey Robin means “a 
people’s felt apprehension of some harm to their collective well-being – the fear of 
terrorism, panic over crime, anxiety about moral decay – or the intimidation 
wielded over men and women by governments of groups” (Robin 2004 : 2). “Politics 
of Fear” also refers to another crucial aspect, that is the connection between 
Power and Fear. As Guglielmo Ferrero wrote in 1942: “Power is the supreme 
manifestation of the fear that man does to himself, despite the efforts to get rid of 
it” (Ferrero 1942: 38). Even the relationship between Power and Fear has ancient 
roots. For example, in the Palazzo Pubblico in Piazza del Campo in Siena there are 
the Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s frescos named The Allegory of Good and Bad 
Government. They date back to the first half of the fourteenth century and 
describe the well-governed town as a prosperous and happy community. In these 
frescos, the presence of an angel can be noticed. This angel, which protects from 
above the city of Siena, is the embodiment of Securitas (Security) and holds in his 
right hand a scroll on which one can read: Senza paura ognuom franco camini 
(“without fear every man may travel freely”). The message is clear: in a well-
governed town, there is no place for fear (Boucheron 2013) because an efficient 
government provides security to its citizens.  
Fear is also an extraordinary political weapon: politicians or governments can 
inflate and use collective fears as a means of social control, to divert public 
opinion from other issues, or to strengthen social cohesion against a real (or 
imaginary) threat or an internal or external enemy. Recently, Ruth Wodak has 
studied the phenomena of right-wing populism by showing the ways in which these 
parties “successfully create fear and legitimise their policy proposals […] with an 
appeal to the necessities of security” (Wodak 2015: 5). Moreover, as Carlo Ginzburg 
has noted, the Power itself can inspire “Fear, Reverence, [and] Terror” (Ginzburg 
2008 and 2017). At the same time, Power has not only this mighty aspect. 
According to Ferrero, in fact, the link between Power and Fear is bidirectional: 
Power inspires fear but can also experience fear (Ferrero 1942: 17) and this is 
particularly true for totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. 
Other questions arise: which social strata to study? Dealing with the history of 
social fears in recent times in Western Europe, especially after the end of the 
second World War, means, to a large extent, study the sensibility and mentality of 
“that vast social universe constituted by the different strata of the middle class” 
(Castronovo 2004 : 7). Middle class is traditionally sensitive to uncertainty 
(Mulholland 2012), and “fear of falling” is probably the main phobia among both 
the working and middle classes nowadays (Ehrenreich 1989).  
All these aspects confirm that Fear is a multidimensional sentiment that 
requires interrogating and confronting a variety of approaches, sources and social 
actors. However, this is not enough. Each of these elements must be studied in 
connection with “the world of experience and with institutions” and each 
information must also be contextualised in terms of time: “Was what people in 
1970s called ‘fear’ the same thing as it was in the 1870s?” – asked Joanna Bourke 
echoing Huizinga’s warnings – “Probably not” (Bourke 2005: 6). Moreover, each 
emotion must be also contextualised on the “geographic-cultural” level. It is 
 De Europa 
Vol. 1, No. 1 (2018) 
21 
 
Gianni Silei 
unquestionable that large part of contributions on fears are Eurocentric, Western-
European centred or American-centred: even though from this point of view thing 
are gradually changing, some recent studies have underlined this “unmistakable 
lacuna in the history of emotions” (Weiss 2012: 8).   
 
 
3. Contemporary Europe and its fears 
What are the roots of contemporary fears? Secondly, can we somehow 
advance a sort of periodization of them? According to many interpretations, La 
Belle Époque marks the apogee of European expansion, the age of the triumph of 
science and technology and it has been described as an age of great optimism. 
However, it is precisely in that phase of great transformations that some ancient 
collective fears grew, and the germs of new alarming apprehensions spread out. 
So, even though this could be interpreted as a paradox, the roots of contemporary 
fears must be sought during the so-called Belle Époque (Silei 2008). 
During this phase, some fears changed, evolved and became ‘modern’. One 
example is the coming of the antisemitism based on social Darwinism, racism and 
conspiracy theories that emerged alongside the ‘old’ antisemitism based on 
religious considerations or blood accusation. Quite often, to use Delumeau’s words, 
a single fear gave rise to a “procession of fears”, triggering collective hysteria or 
generating craze or ‘moral panic’ epidemics (Hillgartner and Bosk 1988). 
Sometimes, fears left the impression of disappearing, but then, like a karstic river, 
they re-emerged some time later.  
In order to periodise fear, we should to distinguish between ‘conjunctural’ 
fears and ‘long-term’ fears. Many of these ‘conjunctural fears’ are linked to the 
most relevant turning points of the twentieth century: the two World Wars and the 
Bolshevik Revolution. After October 1917, in particular, the “spectre” that haunted 
Europe since mid-nineteenth century became tangible, spreading the fear of chaos 
and so generating the first and second “Red Scare”. To these events should be 
added the impact of the main economic crises. In the interwar years, 1929 crisis, 
together with the fear of Bolshevism would have fatal consequences for some 
fragile European liberal democracies such as Italy and Germany. After 1945, other 
crises acted as trigger factors of fears: firstly, the economic instability caused by 
the end of the Bretton Woods as a consequence of the so-called “Nixon shock”, 
then the two Oil Shocks of the 1970s, and the effects determined by 2008 crisis.  
In addition to these great historical, fault lines, some ‘long-term fears’ should 
also be considered. For example: fears related to the coming of the mass society, 
to the effects on social stratification of the changes in the production system (from 
fordism to post-fordism), the changing of dominant economic paradigms (from 
keysianism to neoliberalism and flexible capitalism), the dramatic consequences of 
the Information Technology revolution and the process of globalization.  
Among the long-term fears, probably the most persistent one is the idea of 
the decline of Western civilization. This malaise is strictly connected to the end of 
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Eurocentrism and often associated with concepts as decadence and degeneration 
that, even in this case, emerged during the Belle Époque. After the first post-war, 
this feeling of uncertainty was so deep that seemed to pervade every area of 
knowledge, as evidenced in The Decline of the West by Oswald Spengler or in 
Thomas Mann’s considerations on the crisis of modernity.  
Another relevant turning point was the second post-war. One year before the 
end of the most terrible conflict in human history, Francis Bacon painted Three 
Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion. This work, that symbolised the 
human condition, but above all was a grotesque and disturbing depiction of the 
horrors of the Second World War and a symbol of its legacy, shocked the public 
(Miles 2010). In 1947, Wystan Hugh Auden reflected on the decline of Western 
culture after the end of the war, underlying that “the anxieties exacerbated by 
wartime” did not “evaporate”, but remained, along with a sense of profound 
emptiness, and influenced the post-war years (Jacobs 2011: xv).  
The Second World War brought as legacy a new and terrifying fear: that of a 
nuclear Armageddon. Confirming what Jean Delumeau had observed for some 
premodern fears, the fear of a world war fought with atomic weapons re-emerged 
periodically, sometimes reaching dramatic peaks. Even though, paradoxically, just 
the balance of terror would have guaranteed to Europe decades of peace, there is 
no doubt that the atomic age and the climate of the Cold War multiplied the sense 
of anxiety, fear and paranoia. There was not only the ‘classic’ fear of the enemy – 
external or domestic – but also a deep concern that resulted in the realization that 
a weapon as powerful as the atomic bomb could wipe out not only a nation, but 
also the entire human race. Under the ashes, the fear of a nuclear holocaust, the 
nightmare of a communist revolution or invasion and all the others fears related to 
military, political, and economic confrontation between the two superpowers 
would persist until the collapse of the Berlin Wall.  
The extraordinary growth phase that started in the 1950s apparently 
inaugurated a new season of confidence and optimism. A crucial role in reassuring 
and protecting European population was played on one side by the active role of 
the state in the economy and on the other side by the Welfare State. Keynesianism 
and Welfare State provided full employment, social insurance, health, homes, 
education and culture, social protection to the weaker sectors of societies from the 
cradle to the grave (Urwin 1989: 152). More in general, these policies, at least until 
the mid-1970s crisis, proved to be an excellent instrument for redistributing 
wealth, and favouring social upward mobility.  
During the Golden Age, Europeans seemed to forget the trauma of mass 
insecurity (Judt 2008). Indeed, the second post-war years were crucial, because 
during this phase, besides the ‘Americanization’ of Western European popular 
culture, there was also a sort of process of ‘Americanization’ of collective fears. 
Moreover, even the “Glorious Thirty Years” of Western civilization had their own 
fears (Greif 2015, Immerwahr 2016). The Fear of “the Other”, in its various 
declinations (ethnic, moral, political, gender) and fear of any deviant behaviour, 
for instance, remained and periodically emerged. The common denominator of 
many of these fears was the ‘classic’ search for a scapegoat considered a threat for 
societal values (Cohen 1972, Goode and Ben Yehuda 1994). Particularly interesting 
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was the fear of juvenile criminal gangs or moral panic against the first youth 
countercultures (Teddy Boys, Mods, Rockers and so on) in the 1950s and 1960s.  
After the watershed of the mid-1970s, other fears emerged or reappeared: 
fear of crisis and social downgrading, fear of crime and of the spread of drugs, fear 
of internal terrorism, then, in the 1980s the irrational fear of being infected by 
AIDS, immediately labelled the “gay plague”, for instance (Alcabes 2009, Mnookin 
2011). More recently, although the improvement in living conditions determined by 
scientific and technological advancement, even fears and distrusts related to 
modernization re-emerged, often blend with conspiracy theories or denialism of 
various kinds.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
According to some pessimistic interpretations, “the hundred years after 1900 
were without question the bloodiest century in history” (Ferguson 2006, Conquest 
1999, Todorov 2001). At the same time, the twentieth century was a century of 
impressive development and extraordinary economic and social changes. After 1989 
and 1991 events, the fragile balance achieved after the end of World War II has 
been broken with relevant consequences on the ideological level (Stone 2014). 
At the turn of the Millennium, also those views based on the triumph of the 
Western civilization against the Communist threat and on Fukuyama’s “End of 
History” paradigm have come to an end (Fukuyama 1989 and 1992). In this “post-
American world” (Zakaria 2008) fear and anxiety have risen, multiplied by new 
internal and international scenarios. Western society is now pervaded by a vague 
sense of uncertainty. Paraphrasing Pascal’s Pensées, Nicolas Baverez attributed this 
widespread malaise to the sensation of taking a road leading towards the unknown 
(Baverez 2008). Furthermore, our ‘liquid society’ is increasingly obsessed with 
prevention (Bauman 2006). We all aspire to zero risk, even if we all know that zero 
risk is a nonsense (Sofsky 2005, Beck 2007, Curbet 2008). The paradoxical 
consequence is that “in seeking to avoid fear we may have become more fearful 
than necessary. Our emotional vulnerability has increased” (Stearns 2006: ix).  
What solutions, then? Fear can paralyse societies but can also be a powerful 
driving force for positive change (Boucheron and Robin 2015); in other words, it 
can be both a factor of decline or progress. A possible antidote to the multitude of 
fears that seems to surround post-modern human condition in the West comes from 
History itself. In 1930, Sigmund Freud pointed out that “civilised man has 
exchanged a portion of his possibilities of happiness for a portion of security”, thus 
underlying the intimate (and delicate) connection between security and freedom. 
This aspect is of crucial importance. During an historical phase characterised by a 
prolonged state of fear and anxiety, the main risk for a community is opting for 
give up liberty for security. Historicise past and present fears, can help to 
understand, overcome them and maybe to avoid this risk. As Jean Delumeau has 
argued, we must remember that “throughout a community’s history, fears change 
[…] but Fear remains”, and that “despite these threats, at least in the West, we 
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are privileged. Our ancestors were far more afraid than we are. But, by reducing 
the threats they feared, we have created new ones which must not be neglected”. 
The obsession with security it is not a desirable way to live: “Man’s fate is to live 
in a certain concern, because the counterpart of human freedom is the risk” 
(Delumeau 1993: 17 and 23).  
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